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George Humphrey has described the 
‘welcome’ he received when he took up 
the first chair in psychology at Oxford 
1946.  
 [The] new professor ... found himself the 
jetsam of an acrimonious debate as to 
whether he should exist at all. He heard the 
lions on the shore sniffing round him, 
waiting for him to make a wrong move. 
(Humphrey, 1953, p. 382) 
The chair was established to support the 
new Honours School of Psychology, 
Philosophy and Physiology (PPP). Yet 
the main problem was the philosophers.  
And there were so many of them! As 
Humphrey put it, Oxford had more 
philosophers “to the square mile than 
anywhere else, perhaps with the 
exception of the Vatican” (1953, p. 382). 
R.G. Collingwood was one of the 
philosophers at Oxford who did not 
completely dismiss psychology as an 
impossible science. In fact, as Oxford 
philosophers go, Collingwood kept 
himself remarkably well informed about 
new developments in psychology, 
including psychoanalysis. He even 
chaired a committee of the sub-faculty of 
philosophy in 1928 encouraging the 
establishment of a psychological 
laboratory (Connelly & Costall, 2000). 
Nevertheless, Collingwood seemed to 
set prohibitive limits on what the new 
psychology could properly take on.  
According to Collingwood, it should 
restrict itself to the realm of sensation 
and the irrational, and so, in effect, 
exclude both history and values. 
However, as James Connelly and I have 
pointed out, Collingwood seems also to 
have recognized an alternative viable 
option for psychology (Connelly & 
Costall, 2000). He set out this alternative 
in the context of a critique in which he 
warned psychologists against mistaking 
the historically situated for human 
universals. Referring back to what he 
described as David Hume’s “‘science of 
human nature’ … with its strictly 
empirical methods,” he argued that 
Hume had been mistaken in assuming  
“that human minds had everywhere and 
at all times worked like those of 
eighteenth-century Europeans.” 
However, Collingwood raised no 
objection to such an empirical study, as 
long as it was recognized for what it 
really was, a study of human nature in 
situ - in Hume’s case, “an historical 
study of the contemporary European 
mind” (Collingwood, 1939, pp. 115–116, 
emphasis added). Yet, Collingwood 
never seriously explored the idea of an 
historical psychology in a positive way, 
that is, as an alternative direction in 
which psychology might develop into a 
science, along the lines, say, of Wundt’s 
cultural psychology, or Vygotsky’s 
socio-historical approach to human 
development. 1 
At the time Collingwood was writing, 
Vygotsky’s main work had not been 
translated into English, and Wundt’s 
international reputation had suffered 
badly from his emphatic support of the 
German cause during the First World 
War. There was, however, an example of 
                                               
1
 In contrast to Collingwood, Stephen Toulmin 
has been an enthusiastic proponent of the idea of 
an historical psychology as developed in the 
work of Wundt and also Vygotsky (e.g. Toulmin, 
1987). 
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an attempt at an historical approach to 
psychology that was available much 
closer to home, though not at Oxford, 
but at Cambridge.2 
When Frederic Bartlett (1886-1969) 
began to study at Cambridge, shortly 
before the First World War, the 
Cambridge psychologists had 
established close links with 
anthropology.  Several of them had 
taken part in the anthropological 
expedition to the Torres Straits in 1898 
(Costall, 1999), and two of the main 
figures, W.H.R. Rivers and C.S. Myers, 
led a kind of double life as both 
psychologists and anthropologists. 
Bartlett’s own early research was 
concerned with what he called 
“conventionalisation”, the way material 
from one culture is assimilated into the 
existing schemas of another culture. This 
interest in culture contact stemmed in 
part from the commitment within British 
anthropology to the theory of cultural 
diffusion. But the effects of culture 
contact were also an urgent political 
issue: 
Among English anthropologists the term 
‘culture contact’ has been chiefly restricted 
to the description of the changes caused in 
native societies by the impact of European 
civilization. The depopulation of the 
Pacific, consequent on European 
                                               
2
 Frederic Bartlett became the first professor of 
psychology at Cambridge in 1931, and 
eventually the most powerful figure within 
British psychology. As such, he was in the 
historically unique position of being able to fix 
the professorial appointments throughout Britain 
for many years, and, in this way, also engaged in 
another form of promotion, that of a kind of 
mindless, introverted, experimental psychology 
that persists to the present-day. In fact, this kind 
of psychology has received a new lease of life 
where the same old experiments are being 
conducted all over again, but now connected to 




occupation, stimulated field work on the 
problem of contact … . (Richards, 1939, 
pp. 290-291) 
For many years, Bartlett, like Wundt 
before him, has mainly been 
remembered as an experimental 
psychologist. In more recent years, there 
has been increasing recognition of 
Bartlett’s project for a socio-historical 
psychology. Most of the focus has been 
put upon his still widely cited book, 
Remembering, published in 1932. Yet, 
by the time this book was written, 
Bartlett was, as I have argued elsewhere, 
already on the retreat, opting for a safer 
scientistic image of psychology with 
which to promote his new department. 
As he himself explained, when he had 
published Remembering he had already 
moved beyond what he called his 
“conventionalisation” phase (Bartlett 
1958, p. 144). The First World War had 
interrupted the sequence of his thought, 
and he then came across Head’s 
individualistic notion of the schema 
which led him to place a new emphasis 
upon "constructive imagination and 
thinking" (p. 148). Interestingly, the 
subtitle of Remembering is A study in 
experimental and social psychology, but 
the book is hardly a synthesis. Bartlett’s 
treatment of experimental and social 
psychology is split into two separate 
halves, an early sign of Bartlett’s 
dissociation of these two interests. 
The revisionist accounts of Bartlett, as 
an early champion of an historical 
psychology disagree about his eventual 
commitment to that ideal. The 
anthropologist, Mary Douglas (1987, p. 
81) claimed that Bartlett simply dropped 
the idea, and she portrayed Bartlett as a 
victim of his institutional setting. Yet, 
the institutional setting of early 
Cambridge psychology was not pre-
ordained, and Bartlett, as an astute 
academic politician, must have played 
some part in the transfer of his 
department from the faculty of Moral 
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Sciences to Natural Sciences. In any 
case, he seems to have been pleased with 
the outcome. As he recalled, “the 
Psychological Laboratory was … placed 
where it properly belonged, with 
Physiology, Biochemistry and Pathology 
. . . Very nearly all the subsequent 
changes have grown out of this one.” 
(Bartlett, 1937, p. 108; emphasis added). 
In contrast, Derek Edwards and David 
Middleton (1987) portray Bartlett as a 
hero-figure resolutely championing a 
socio-historical approach to psychology 
throughout his career. 
In fact, Bartlett’s eventual attitude to 
socio-historical psychology could best 
be described as NIMD-ism: let’s have a 
radical historical psychology, but Not In 
My Department. He never appointed any 
social psychologists to his department. 
He even discouraged social approaches 
in relation to applied research. David 
Duncan, who was a member along with 
Bartlett of the Scientific Advisory 
Committee of the National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology, has described 
Bartlett as a “cantankerous reactionary 
… [who] definitely had the boundaries 
of psychology as an applied science very 
tightly drawn, for others at any rate” 
(Duncan, 1999; emphasis added). 
Duncan’s qualification - “for others at 
any rate” - is telling. Bartlett never 
forgot his commitment to this alternative 
historical conception of psychology. As 
he himself put it, it remained his 
“leading interest” (Bartlett, 1957, p. 72). 
There was a conflict between Bartlett’s 
efforts to present Cambridge psychology 
as a ‘hard’, natural science, and his 
“leading interest” in social psychology. 
Sometimes, this led to absurd situations. 
After the Second World War, Bartlett 
obtained research money from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to help Terence 
Lee complete his research on people’s 
sense of urban neighbourhood. The 
research was related to the 
Government’s post-war re-housing 
initiative, and Bartlett was keen on the 
work because of its wider policy 
implications. But, locally, he was 
pushing the line about psychology being 
a hard science, and Lee’s research did 
not exactly fit in: 
. . . halfway through my Ph.D, round about 
1951, Bartlett was making a big play (he 
spent a lot of time on university politics, 
where he was very influential) to shake off 
the image of “Moral Sciences”.  . . . He 
called me in one day and explained, 
apologetically, that my particular 
dissertation project was a bit of an 
embarrassment to him in this campaign. It 
could hardly have been more quantitative 
(I was the first to adopt Discriminant 
Function Analysis from Physical 
Anthropology to Social Psychology!) but it 
was not experimental — it was 
observational. This was the main source of 
the problem. Anyway, he asked if I would 
be so kind as to seek affiliation to a more 
congruent Department and he made several 
suggestions, including Anthropology and 
Human Ecology. I followed up the latter 
and received a warm welcome. (Lee, 1995)  
In fact, although Lee was no longer 
officially a member of Bartlett’s 
department, nothing changed. He 
continued to remain in the department 
with Bartlett, and successfully 
completed his thesis in 1954.  
In the end, Bartlett came to regret the 
official version of psychology he had so 
carefully promoted, that of an essentially 
experimental science, and a highly 
introverted one at that. Beate Hermelin 
told me that when she was a young 
student and newly arrived in England, 
she met Bartlett at Cambridge at a 
particularly tedious research meeting 
(most likely, therefore, one held by the 
Experimental Psychology Society). She 
said she was embarrassed that she could 
hardly conceal her disappointment about 
the triviality of the research. “Oh yes,” 
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Bartlett, confided to her, it’s all gone 
wrong. I wish I’d written novels instead” 
(Hermelin, 1994). 
Bartlett set out his idea of an historical 
psychology in his book, The psychology 
of primitive culture, published in 1923. 
This book was based on lectures he had 
given at Bedford College, in London, 
with the encouragement of W.H.R. 
Rivers. At the very outset of his book, 
Bartlett takes on what he calls "the time-
honoured question of the relation 
between sociology and psychology".  He 
refers to Rivers’ claim that the 
sociologist could, and indeed should, 
disregard psychological facts, and 
"rigorously confine his attention to 
purely social determination" (Bartlett 
1923, p. 25).  Bartlett agrees with this 
position as far as the sociologist is 
concerned, and he provides plenty of 
examples of group processes, such as the 
elaboration of rituals (see pp. 161, 206-8 
& 212-3), where there is “no necessary 
connexion with conscious purpose, and 
[the result] is, in fact, rarely or never 
foreseen by any individual” (p. 161).   
But he insists that the argument does not 
work both ways.  Psychology cannot 
divorce itself from sociology, for that 
would tempt us to do exactly what we 
should avoid - seek explanations which 
"always … go back to the individual as 
he may be pictured to exist outside of 
any social group" (p. 8). 
Bartlett purpose was to challenge the 
possibility of what he called a 
“prehistoric psychology”: 
... the attempt to find the beginning of 
social customs and institutions in 
purely individual experience may be 
essentially a mistaken one.  In general 
terms our problem is to account for a 
response made by an individual to a 
given set of circumstances of which 
the group itself may always be one. 
… It is only if we interpret individual 
to mean pre-social that we can take 
psychology to be prehistoric. The 
truth is that there are some individual 
responses which simply do not occur 
outside a social group. To look for 
these outside such a group is to court 
failure, and leads inevitably to 
speculation and guess-work. (Bartlett, 
1923, pp. 11-13.) 
In his 1923 book, Bartlett envisaged 
social psychology not merely as a 
supplement to general psychology, but 
as an inclusive approach to human 
psychology that was social and historical 
to the core.  In contrast to Collingwood, 
and indeed most so-called cultural 
psychologists, including Vygotsky, as 
far as Bartlett was concerned, there were 
hardly any aspects of human psychology 
beyond the reach of history. 
Bartlett was promoting an approach to 
the individual as necessarily nested 
within a social order.  We discover, as it 
were, the individual - what is individual 
- within the group (pp. 279-280). We 
start with those conditions that are 
general to all groups, then consider those 
processes which are specific to the 
group, such as particular modes and 
mechanisms of the transmission and 
maintenance of culture.  Only then, 
Bartlett insists, may we "legitimately 
attempt to go further" (if indeed the 
group is sufficiently open to direct 
observation) and "try to trace what are 
the variations of individual attitude in 
regard to the specialised social 
responses": 
If we can do this successfully for all our 
problems we have taken the final step in 
the development of a complete social 
psychology.  For we have now effected a 
union between that study of the 
individual as such which is the concern 
of general psychological investigation, 
and that account of the psychical 
conditions of behaviour in the group 
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which social psychology sets itself to 
pursue. (Bartlett, 1923, p. 280) 
Bartlett also challenged the standard 
contrast between the primitive and 
civilized mind. According to Bartlett, the 
usual contrast was based upon a 
misleading comparison, "not between 
the primitive man and the ordinary 
member of a modern social group, but 
between the former and the scientific 
expert at work within his own field" 
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 284). 
So far I have tried to convey the gist of 
Bartlett’s idea of an historical 
psychology. But why did Bartlett fail to 
pursue this project? Mary Douglas 
(1987, p. 81) once nicely observed that 
“psychologists are institutionally 
incapable of remembering that humans 
are social beings. As soon as they know 
it, they forget it.” I now want to identify 
some of the issues that keep leading 
psychologists to forget - or in Bartlett’s 
case, suppress - the idea of psychology 
as history. I will start with Bartlett’s own 
hang-ups. 
Already, in his second book, 
Remembering, Bartlett is framing his 
commitment to the idea of an historical 
psychology in a grudging way. When he 
explains that the group can influence the 
individual both directly, through the 
actual presence of other people, and also 
indirectly, through the influence of the 
group's beliefs, conventions, customs, 
traditions, and institutions, he seems far 
from happy with the implications: 
… this is, theoretically speaking, rather 
troublesome, because it seems to mean 
that everything in psychology belongs to 
social psychology, except idiosyncrasies 
and such forms of reaction as are 
immediately and dominantly determined 
by physical stimuli. (Bartlett 1932, p. 
243; emphases added.) 
One obvious problem, given the 
Department had moved from Moral to 
Natural Sciences, was that an historical 
conception of psychology hardly 
conformed to what his colleagues in the 
faculty regarded as serious science. But 
Bartlett also had his own methodological 
misgivings. Indeed, by 1957, he came to 
the following gloomy conclusion: 
To us, as to [Rivers], there seems little 
chance of developing a sound social 
psychology unless first the problems of 
its methodology can be settled.  But we 
have given up the idea that it possible to 
establish a method on the grounds of its 
rationality, or indeed any other general 
ground.  ... [There is now] a muddle ... 
(Bartlett, 1957, pp. 75-6.) 
Bartlett is widely celebrated within 
psychology for encouraging researchers 
to ‘loosen up,’ and ensure that their 
experiments are relevant and stay close 
to real life. And yet Bartlett became 
obsessed with the strictures of method in 
a way I still find puzzling. Very early in 
his career, Rivers had somehow 
managed to convince Bartlett that the 
method of experimental psychology was 
fundamental to anthropological research, 
even though, as Bartlett himself 
admitted, Rivers never actually 
explained to him exactly how this was 
supposed to work out!  It seems to have 
been a kind of conversion experience: 
I can bring back to mind very clearly the 
first time I met Rivers.  Already he had 
reduced the large, somewhat military 
looking moustache which adorns his 
earlier photographs.  He seemed to me 
tall, spare, sharp-shouldered, full of 
nervous though quiet energy.  He sat on a 
sofa in a large room untidy with books 
and papers.  A College 'gyp' brought up 
tea, two or three bits of bread and butter, 
and some very sawdusty Madeira cake.  
He ate nothing and drank only milk and 
water.  He told me then, and many times 
later, that if I wanted to study 
anthropology, or, I gathered, do anything 
else that was any good, I must first spend 
many hours in the psychological 
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laboratory learning the psycho-physical 
methods.  I did. (Bartlett, 1956, p. 82) 
Throughout his career, Bartlett kept 
returning to this issue, and kept coming 
up with his own solutions about how 
experimental psychology was supposed 
to make its crucial contribution. He 
eventually settled upon the strange idea 
that somehow the experimental 
psychologists, by carefully pursuing 
what they, at least, regarded as decidedly 
non-social problems, would somehow, in 
the process of their research, perfect an 
appropriate method suitable for the 
anthropologists in the field. In other 
words, an historical psychology would 
have to wait until the appropriate 
methods had been devised for it by an 
experimental, and essentially 
individualistic, psychology: 
One thing is so immediately obvious that it 
hardly needs to be said. It is rarely if ever 
possible to obtain results from controlled 
laboratory investigations which are 
immediately valid and important in the 
field of social psychology. . … The 
primary problem for the laboratory 
psychologist interested in social 
psychology is, not that he should at present 
try to investigate admittedly important 
facts in any wide social setting, but that he 
should try to devise the most exact 
methods possible for an investigation of 
facts which have a definite social 
application. These methods he must then 
hand on to the field psychologist, who will 
use them as faithfully as he can, not 
hesitating to introduce modifications if 
necessary, though with as little departure 
as possible from whatever exactness of 
control the laboratory has been able to 
achieve. (Bartlett 1939, pp. 25-26) 
There are wider reasons why 
psychologists shy away from taking 
history seriously. For those coming from 
a background in experimental 
psychology, it has always been tempting 
to mark out a domain of human 
psychology that is universal and hence, 
to use Bartlett’s own term, prehistoric. 
For them, scientific laws should be 
universal. It is breathtaking the way that 
the ‘laws’ they claim to discover are 
simply assumed to be universal, even 
when based, as they often are, on the 
most restricted of ‘samples’: 
 
When I mention a psychological subject, I 
mean a subject from a Western, 
industrialised culture; and not only from a 
Western industrialised culture, but an 
American; and not only an American, but a 
college student. (Jahoda, 1970, p. 13) 
However, it is also remarkable the extent 
to which the so-called ‘cultural 
psychologists’, despite their seemingly 
radical emphasis upon cultural diversity, 
set their own definite limits on how 
much people might differ despite their 
different socio-historical circumstances. 
Their concern is, presumably, that a 
socio-historical approach to psychology 
could go too far, morally and politically. 
It might challenge the very principle of 
psychic unity. It has become almost 
standard within cross-cultural 
psychology to insist - and assume - that 
it is only the content, not the form, of 
human mentality that can differ in 
different socio-historical circumstances. 
For example, this a priori distinction is 
maintained in the work of Michael Cole, 
one of the leading figures in modern 
cultural psychology. As John 
Greenwood has noted, 
None of Cole’s illustrative samples of 
cultural psychological theory and 
practice constitute illustrations of 
historically or culturally local forms of 
psychological functioning: they are all 
readily interpretable as different cultural 
or historical manifestations of putatively 
universal forms of psychological 
functioning. (Greenwood, 1999, p. 511, 
emphasis added; see also Tulviste, 1991) 
Even Vygotsky set up a dualism between 
two lines of human development: the 
biological and cultural. Furthermore, 
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despite his socio-historical approach to 
human development, the eventual 
outcome of development is to render the 
person as asocial. According to an 
influential, neo-Vygotskyan metaphor, 
adults provide the “scaffolding” that 
supports the child’s development. But it 
is, of course, in the nature of scaffolding 
that it will be eventually removed, thus 
leaving us with a self-standing 
construction: the autonomous individual 
posited by standard psychological 
theory. 
In contrast to the ‘competition,’ 
therefore, Bartlett’s historical 
psychology would have been truly 
radical. It would not, as in the case of 
Wundt, have been restricted to the 
‘higher mental functions’, nor 
committed to the dualisms, current 
within socio-historical psychology, of 
form and content, and biology and 
culture. Yet, in Bartlett’s case, he did not 
simply put strict limits on the scope of 
‘history’ in his version of historical 
psychology. He suppressed the entire 
project over the course of his long 
career. 
 
Bartlett and Collingwood and 
the idea of an historical 
psychology 
 
Finally, I want now to return to 
Collingwood, and address what are, in 
effect, two versions of the same 
question: 
1. If Bartlett had developed his 
historical psychology, would 
Collingwood have recognized it as a 
proper way for psychology to 
develop? 
2. Why did Collingwood not pursue 
the idea he himself had floated of an 
historical psychology (Connelly & 
Costall, 2000)?  
In a discussion of Wittgenstein’s 
objections to psychology, Goldfarb has 
argued that Wittgenstein’s real 
complaint was that psychology was 
scientistic, not that it was scientific. 
Unfortunately, by the time of 
Wittgenstein and Collingwood, this is a 
distinction that could no longer be easily 
made. With the rise of scientific 
naturalism in the nineteenth-century, 
‘science’ and ‘scientific objectivity’ had 
both come to take on quite a new 
meaning (Turner, 1974; Daston, 2000). 
The newly professionalized science had 
become political, challenging the 
existing authorities, and claiming its own 
exclusive access to the truth. Science 
became scientistic. (It is remarkable how 
the standard texts with such promising 
titles as “What is this thing called 
science?” never mention this rather 
important historical fact.) 
Furthermore, even if among the 
sciences, the scientific gains of 
psychology and sociology are still 
widely regarded as puny, these 
disciplines were crucial for fulfilling the 
claim that science – in other words, 
scientists – had the final world not only 
regarding how the ‘world’ really works, 
but also human affairs. Thus, if no more 
than ‘place holders,’ the creation of 
departments of psychology and 
sociology was essential, ideologically, to 
this whole social transformation. 
Collingwood was no fool and must have 
recognized the strategic role of 
psychology in the promotion of the new 
scientistic science. His polemic against 
psychology was surely at one with 
Wittgenstein’s 
a trenchant attempt to protect and 
conserve a domain of knowledge and 
form of understanding from erosion and 
distortion by the scientific spirit of the 
age. (Hacker, 2001, p. 42).  
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Now what could constitute a more 
profound threat to humanistic 
understanding than a self-consciously 
historical psychology encroaching into 
the domain of history? This surely is 
why Collingwood was so concerned to 
put such tight boundaries around the 
scope of modern, scientific, psychology. 
But this could also explain why 
Collingwood, the historian, and someone 
who never missed a chance to have a 
‘go’ at psychologists whenever they 
overstepped those boundaries, 
nevertheless did not rant against David 
Hume’s proposal for a ‘science of 
human nature’ – even though, as 
Collingwood insisted, it was inevitably 
historical by its very nature. In Hume’s 
time, science had not become scientistic, 
and a science of psychology, the big 
hope of scientism, had not yet been 
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Could you give me an example of the 
kind of thing Greenwood was talking 
about when criticising Cole? 
 
Alan Costall 
Take categorisation. Within cognitive 
psychology, categorisation is seen very 
much as something universal and 
fundamental, rather than a specific and 
situated kind of practice. It is supposed 
to be the way that any creature could 
possibly exist in the world. If we did not 
categorise things we would be in chaos, 
in a blooming buzzing confusion. So you 
have plenty of cross-cultural research 
about how different people categorize 
things differently, but nevertheless based 
on the assumption that categorization 
itself is a universal and fundamental 
cognitive function. For example, there 
has been extensive work on cultural 
differences in colour categorization. […] 
The investigators travel to exotic places, 
come out from the bushes, or wherever, 
with a case full of colour samples, and 
on the look out for interesting cultural 
differences. But [they look] within strict 
limits. First of all, of course, they take it 
for granted that everyone understands 
what a psychology experiment is 
supposed to be about, and, in this 
instance, that everyone shares the same 
abstracted notion of ‘colour.’ The only 
issue up for grabs, empirically, as far as 
the researchers are concerned, is how the 
people being studied draw the 
boundaries between different colours. So 
for most cultural psychologists, 
categorization and the ‘objects’ to which 
it is applied are largely taken for granted. 
 
Wes Sharrock 
Sorry, so what exactly is Greenwood 
criticising Cole for? 
 
Alan Costall 
Well for precisely doing that. For not 
going for broke. In my example, for not 
considering whether the people they are 
studying actually share our sense of 
colour as an abstracted property. 3 Can 
                                               
3
 Saunders, B.A.C. (1995). Disinterring 
basic color terms: A study in the 
mystique of See Saunders, B.A.C. 
(1995). Disinterring basic color terms: A 
study in the mystique cognitivism. 
History of the Human Sciences, 8, 19–
38, & Saunders, B.A.C., & Brakel, J. 
van (1997). Are there nontrivial 
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we find people who are actually doing 
things in a radically different way from 
us, not just doing what we happen to do 
but differently, that is the criticism. 
 
Dave Francis 
I don’t really know anything about 
Bartlett, so can you say a bit more about 
how Bartlett went about creating the 
scientific psychology at Cambridge and 
well, why it had to go that way? You 
seem to be implying that it had to go that 
way. Is it to do with university politics, 
the immaturity of a new department, 
where they must appear to fit in with the 




One of the main sources of experimental 
psychology was experimental 
physiology of senses, and the research of 
people like Helmholtz and even Fechner, 
so there was an already established 
model of what an experimental 
psychology ought to look like. 
Interestingly, at the beginning of 
Bartlett’s book on remembering there is 
a penetrating critique of a certain notion 
of what experiments should look like. 
He talks about how the psychologist 
should not “stand in awe” of the 
“stimulus.” In fact when Bartlett did any 
kind of research on his own behalf, it did 
not accord at all with the strict ideal of 
experiment promoted within his own 
department at Cambridge. Bartlett 
published a strange book on thinking 
when he retired and I think it is 
significant that he published it only after 
he had retired. It was based on 
interviews and asking people how they 
solve problems and all the rest of it. It 
didn’t look a bit like Cambridge 
experimental psychology. 
 
                                                                 
constraints on color categorization? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 167–
228.  
Question 
So, is it like Wittgenstein when he had to 
get out, he had to go to an island to get 
his ideas together for the Investigations 




It is interesting about Wittgenstein and 
psychology at Cambridge. Wittgenstein 
got involved in some of the early work 
on the psychology of music for example.  
C. S. Myers, Bartlett’s ‘patron’ at 
Cambridge, was very much into that sort 
of stuff. Curiously, despite the later 
Wittgenstein’s view that experimental 
psychology was terminally confused, I 
have found no signs in my work of 
personal tensions between the 
philosophers and psychologists at 
Cambridge that there were at Oxford. 
 
But to get back to Bartlett. He was faced 
with two problems. The first was the 
extent to which the new psychology 
should be identified with experimental 
psychology. To a large extent this had 
been decided for him, when Myers 
established the Laboratory of 
Experimental Psychology. The second 
problem was what form experimental 
psychology should take. Kurt Danziger 
has emphasized the obvious but widely 
repressed fact that the psychology 
experiment is an institution. To get 
people to take part in the exercise they 
have to understand what they are letting 
themselves in for. Furthermore, 
experimental psychology has taken 
distinctly different forms. It is interesting 
with Wundt’s experimental psychology 
that it was the subject who was actually 
the expert, and who typically published 
the paper. The experimenter was just a 
technician, presenting things for the 
expert ‘subject’ to respond to. There is 
another kind of model which Danziger 
describes as developing in France, in 
relation to hypnotism, etc., where the 
subjects, themselves, do not know what 
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is going on. Another kind of model is set 
up in America where you have students 
taking part in large groups, aware that 
they are contributing to science, but 
again they don’t really know what is 
going on, since such knowledge is 
supposed to contaminate the results. The 
curious thing is that Bartlett opted for 
precisely the ‘physicalist’ model of 
experimentation that he so famously 
criticized in the first chapter of 
Remembering. My view is that with the 
move of the Department from Moral to 
Natural Sciences, Bartlett became 
trapped. Research had to be done, seen 
to be done, and also to look much like 
what his colleagues in physiology (with 
whom the psychologists shared the 
building), and the research funders, etc. 
thought it should look like. Bartlett was 
responsible for many staff without 
tenure who were funded by short-term 
research contracts. 
 
Ivan Leudar:  
There are several things. One, I am 
completely puzzled by the comment on 
Rivers, and that he was actually insisting 
that only through using experimental 
methods can you move psychology 
somewhere. I am puzzled because 
Instinct and the Unconscious for 
example is actually very interesting, and 
nowhere there is he using an 
experimental method - he examines his 
own practice reflectively. What he does 
is almost ethno-methodological: he 
works, he reflects on what he does, he 
uses his knowledge. It is very interesting 
how in doing this he reworks nicely the 
idea of repression [for him it depends on 
education and training rather than being 
something in the universal human 
nature] and he has got something which 
is very vivid. So, why would a man like 
that, who obviously knows what he is 
doing when he is doing it, why would he 
actually be insisting that psychology has 
to use experimental methods? I am just 
completely puzzled - I do not understand 
him.  
 
One more thing, you seem to be talking 
as if the history of psychology was 
starting in Cambridge at this point, and 
these people were, at this point, insisting 
that psychology should be an empirical 
discipline.  It just seems to me that it 
can’t be like that.  If you take it back to 
what I was digging out of Collingwood 
(quite deliberately in a biased way) the 
business actually starts in 16th century. 
[…] So if this is right then you would 
have had a variety of psychologists, 
some of them philosophical like in 
Scotland, some of them actually 
empirical scientists like those dealing 
with memories and perceptions. So what 
account do you give of somebody like 
Rivers, doing something that he is doing, 
would Collingwood have to say 
something about that? 
 
Alan Costall:  
Bartlett provides several accounts of his 
meeting with Rivers. In an appropriately 
Bartlettian way, the details are not 
consistent. (In one version it is not even 
Rivers but one of his fellow researchers 
who puts the spell upon Bartlett.) You 
need to remember that Rivers initially 
established his reputation for his work 
on the physiology of the senses. One 
version Bartlett gives of the role of 
experimentation is that it is a kind of 
initiation. Anyone who hasn’t gone 
through the discipline of doing 
experimental psychology is going to be 
careless. So it is partly a kind of 
discipline thing, stopping people being 
‘sloppy’.  But there is also the issue of 
calibration which kept coming up in the 
context of psychophysics: becoming 
aware of the characteristics and 
limitations of the observer. So, one way 
or another, there is this aspect of 
initiation. This is how it worked out in 
the USA. Famous psychologists, like 
Thorndike, having done their initial 
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work in experimental psychology, put 
experimentation aside. This in part was 
for financial reasons (there simply 
weren’t the jobs in experimental 
psychology).  But the idea was that once 
they had gone through the training they 
were now scientifically transformed. I 
suppose it is like the anthropologists. As 
PhD students they undergo a punishing 
time, suffering in the ordeal of field-
work. Then they come back home, get 
an academic position, and spend the rest 
of their careers taking it easy and 
publishing. Bartlett (along with his other 
main mentor, Myers) certainly made 
these points, but it is also the case that 
Bartlett also reckoned that 
experimentation, in some form, would 
be necessary as the standard method for 
an historical psychology. 
 
Ivan Leudar 
The other thing was really a comment 
expressing a small disagreement. It is on 
Vygotsky and Russia when he and Luria 
were working there. I wouldn’t think 
that there was actually any official 
presupposition about the psychological 
unity of mankind then.  In fact it would 
be the exact opposite, you would have 
different classes and these would be 
quite different mentally, some 
progressive and some backward, and 
what Vygotsky would be doing would be 
actually standing up for an individual.  I 
always thought that, even though he has 
a theory of socialisation and 
internalisation, that theory actually 
reflects the situation in Russia at the 
time when people are being re-educated, 
sometimes quite forcefully, but even that 
re-education in his way is never a 
situation in which you become 
completely engulfed by and in the social. 
Vygotsky is always leaving a niche for 
the individual to resist and which 
actually allows one to be natural. 
 
John Pickstone  
So to continue then in your spirit, to 
underline the huge importance of 
physiology in Cambridge: I think in 
most places it ranks closely with 
medicine but at Cambridge it ranks with 
physics. […] It has terrific power.  […] 
part of its selling power is this training 
thing, which is particularly important for 




Some of the people I have interviewed 
have said how embarrassing they found 
it as psychologists even to be sharing the 
same building with distinguished 




What I am less clear about is the other 
part of the local context where a guy 
could go to sociology, or to human 
ecology which is a very peculiar 
formation. So if you could just say a 
little about that and then we will switch 
and I will ask about Collingwood in 
Oxford and what sort of local politics 




So about Cambridge first: I have found 
no references to these developments in 
my work on Bartlett. The first chair in 
sociology was not established until 1970, 
the year after Bartlett died, and, 
according to its first holder, there was 
not much going on beforehand.4 I do not 
                                               
4
 "Today ... I find myself with the heavy 
responsibility of justifying a new chair in a 
discipline which in this university is still 
striving for full recognition. ... There are two 
salient features which distinguish the state of 
sociology in Cambridge from the situation 
found in many other major universities.  
First, the decision to establish a chair in 
sociology was taken only very recently; and 
second, there are many members of the 
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know about human ecology at 
Cambridge, but I guess this was a post-
war development, so Bartlett would be 
close to retirement. 
 
The Second World War changed the 
whole picture with all the military 
research that was going on. Bartlett gets 
shifted even more into a sort of 
engineering style of psychology because 
of the war work, and through the 
influence of Craik, an amazing student 
from Scotland who came to work with 
Bartlett and absolutely charmed him. 
Craik really gets into this kind of 
engineering approach to psychology but 
again I think Bartlett begins to see how it 
starts to go wrong in the hands of some 
of his other students. I have letters of 
Bartlett’s where he is extremely negative 
about the triviality of their work based 
on mechanical analogies.  
 
Going back to the early days with 
Bartlett, one of the things worth bearing 
in mind is that Bartlett gets to 
Cambridge just before the First World 
War, and very soon all of the other 
people go off and in some way or 
another get involved in the war work. So 
he is left pretty well on his own and in a 
very vulnerable position because the 
department really had not got a very safe 
base. The laboratory would not have 
been there in any case unless Myers, 
whose family were very rich, had not put 
up the money. It was a funny set-up.  
After the war, Bartlett was still very 
much on his own, James Ward had given 
up any interest in this new psychology, 
Rivers died just after the war, and then 
Myers goes away in a huff and sets up 
the NIIP, the National Institute of 
                                                                 
university, junior as well as senior, who do 
not regard sociology as a proper academic 
subject." Barnes, John Arundel, 1970, 
Sociology in Cambridge. Inaugural lecture 
of the Professor of Sociology, 15 October, 
1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 1. 
Industrial Psychology, so I can 
understand why Bartlett could feel so 
vulnerable and so prepared to shape 
Cambridge psychology to what those 
surrounding him thought psychology at 
Cambridge should look like. 
 
John Pickstone  
What about Oxford, when Collingwood 
is making polemics against psychology, 
to what extent is that appropriate to the 
local context? 
 
Alan Costall  
His targets are not local. They are people 
like Freud, Lloyd Morgan at Bristol, and 
Spearman at London. After all, there is 
not much local going on. There weren’t 
any psychologists in Oxford worth 
‘going for’ until quite a bit later. The 
thing with Collingwood is that he had no 
initial misgivings about psychology as 
long as it behaves itself, and restricts 
itself to the limited agenda he set for it. 
 
James Connelly 
Can I just pick up on that? There are 
two, maybe three points. The first point 
is - I think Collingwood had a general 
concern with psychology and its place in 
explanation or understanding. When you 
come to the particular Oxford context I 
think there are at least two events which 
are important here. I mean one is the 
proposal to set up a psychological 
laboratory in Oxford which was earlier 
than the proposal to set up the course 
and Collingwood was involved in both 
because it went to the philosophers to 
discuss whether or not the psychology 
laboratory should be set up. Essentially 
the point was, we should look after it so 
that they don’t overstep their boundaries 
[…] It wasn’t that he was opposed to it 
so much that it should be kept in its 
place. And the same with any joint 
proposal for psychology programmes 
and so on. The other point worth making 
[is that] Collingwood went to Haldane’s 
laboratory and participated in and 
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observed the experiments on the 
physiology of perception just before 
Haldane died. I presume he did this 
before 1936, as Haldane died in 1936. 
Collingwood refers to this in the lectures 
on realism that he wrote in that year. As 
far as Collingwood was concerned, this 
was very good, interesting experimental 
science which he was perfectly prepared 
to accept as being a valid form of 
knowledge. The problem is when 
psychology then goes and tries to 
explain too much or explains what he 
thinks it categorically cannot explain. So 
I think you can say very clearly that in 
this sense he was in favour of the science 
of psychology but not in favour of its 
improper extension. 
 
Alan Costall  
I think in the end it is the very idea of a 
science of psychology that he doesn’t 
like. Because it is not only trying to open 
up a space of naturalistic explanations 
but also threatening to close down other 
spaces, namely humanistic 
understanding. 
 
Mathieu Marion  
I wanted to pick up on something that 
has been said, in reply to what you said. 
I think he never had any qualms in as 
much as psychology was committed to 
the sort of experimental stuff  about 
perception […] and even in the 
autobiography I do not think he has any 
qualms –  
 
Alan Costall 
 - But it is that issue, about overstepping 
the boundary. You find him going for 
people, I mean some of this is very ad 
hominen. Ivan quoted this thing from our 
paper as it happens, Donagen says, 
‘every psychologist to whose notice it 
has been brought has been justly angered 
by what Collingwood wrote of 
psychology in his Essay on 
Metaphysics.’ I am probably brought to 
this inference by thinking about 
Wittgenstein’s misgivings about the very 
idea of a psychology in the end. 
 
Mathieu Marion  
Okay let’s put it that way, there is a very 
narrow field in which there is no 
problem with doing this physiological 
inquiry that is psychology - everything 
else is confusion […] 
 
Alan Costall  
I am not an expert on Collingwood, and 
one thing that puzzled me when I was 
working with James Connelly on our 
paper on Collingwood, was that 
Collingwood identifies two issues in 
relation to putting limits upon the scope 
of a naturalistic psychology, but they do 
not seem to be connected together by 
him. The first is the normative, or 
criteriological, as not being properly part 
of psychology, but there is also the other 
point about the historically situated not 
being a proper subject for psychology. It 
seems to me there are plenty of 
examples where we can talk about 
people going about their business as 
being historically situated but which I 
would not count as criteriological. For 
example, the way people walk.  Mauss 
talked about this, years ago, in terms of 
body techniques, people in different 
cultures walk differently but is that 
normative?  
 
Mathieu Marion  
In your story about Bartlett moving 
away from social psychology - what was 
his interaction with the philosophers? 
Because all through his lifetime the 
philosophers were saying extremely 
negative things about psychology […] 
and couldn’t it be the case that actually 
having been sort of brainwashed by all 
these idealist philosophers […] that in 
the end he sets up next to physiology and 
forget about the rest […] Could there be 
something like this also involved? 
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Alan Costall  
It is interesting, but I am not aware of 
any kind of real interactions between 
Bartlett and the philosophers, and this is 
curious because the Tripos degree 
involved both philosophy and 
psychology. According to the accounts 
of people who took the course, the 
teaching was completely 
compartmentalised. You did your 
psychology and you did your 
philosophy, pretty much like a lot of so-
called ‘joint honours’ schemes in other 
universities. 
 
Alan Collins  
There is a story, isn’t there, about him 
going up to Cambridge to do philosophy 
and he gets to the squash, meets Russell 
and Moore and decides not to do 
philosophy. 
 
Wes Sharrock  
I was just wondering whether something 
like this was involved: it is a feature 
certainly of sociology that the people 
who have the schemes to make a  
science always assume that it is someone 
else’s work to deliver it. They are not 
interested in working it out once they 
have laid out how it is to be, somebody 
else can go and do it. I was carried right 
back to my earliest days here when of 
course one of the reasons we got 
involved in ethnomethodology was that 
we were fed up with what we then called 
programmatics, which were the endless 
delivery of new manifestos with no 
follow through. Not a lot has changed 
since then. A small but nice example of 
the discontinuity between the top of the 
organisation and the underlings might 
have been here because as we 
understood in the 60’s when the 
Manchester Psychology Department was 
under Cohen [then head of the 
department], if you worked in the 
department you did rats and fruit-flies 
with absolutely no admission of 
anything else. Cohen wrote books on 
footballers, how they scored goals, on 
gambling, and so on. Yes? 
Alan Costall  
Yes! 
 
